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We contribute to the literature on the heterogeneity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and the 
relevance of firm characteristics for analyzing the determinants of outward foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The focus is on the role of firm-level heterogeneity when MNEs decide on the share of ownership 
in foreign affiliates. We combine two firm-specific datasets on German MNEs with varying equity 
stakes in Indian affiliates. The impact of firm characteristics on ownership shares is assessed in the 
context of OLS and fractional logit models, controlling for industry and location characteristics. We 
show that the effect of several characteristics differs between the establishment of new affiliates by 
German MNEs and their engagement in already existing Indian firms. Most notably, the productivity of 
the German parents matters only for ownership shares in new affiliates. 
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This paper contributes to the recent literature on the heterogeneity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) by 
analyzing the relevance of firm-specific characteristics when MNEs decide on the share of ownership in 
foreign affiliates. We combine two largely unnoticed datasets on German MNEs with varying equity stakes 
in Indian affiliates. The impact of firm characteristics on ownership shares is assessed in the context of 
OLS and Fractional logit models, controlling for industry and location characteristics. 
The analysis shows that several factors are clearly correlated with higher ownership shares. For instance, 
larger parent companies prefer higher equity shares. The formation of a new firm in India, i.e., an arguably 
more technology intensive engagement than a joint venture with an already existing firm, generally implies 
a higher ownership share by the German parent. The correlation between the productivity of the parent 
firm and its ownership share, though positive, remains statistically insignificant – in contrast to what could 
be expected. 
A distinct novelty of the present paper helps disentangle the links between the parent’s productivity and its 
ownership share. The data allows examining whether there are differences in the determinants of the 
ownership share between the establishment of new affiliates by German MNEs and their engagement in 
already existing Indian firms. Indeed, the effect of several firm characteristics (and also industry 
characteristics) differs between these two subsamples of affiliates. Most notably, the productivity of the 
German parents matters only for ownership shares in new affiliates. It appears that the productivity of the 
parent is relevant for operating at the technological frontier and further upgrading the level of technology 
for the setup of a new firm employing relatively sophisticated technology. By contrast, the productivity of 
the parent does not play a role when German companies invest in existing firms with less than 
sophisticated technology. 
In terms of policy implications our work points to a major aspect of heterogeneity that needs to be taken 
into account by governments attracting foreign direct investment to boost their growth performance. There 
is an important distinction in terms of productivity and, by implication technology between newly set up 
firms and existing firms which attract some capital inflow from abroad. Host-country governments aiming 
at greenfield FDI by productive MNEs may be well advised to relax foreign ownership restrictions, as India 
has done since the early 1990s, in order to get better access to foreign technology. 
    
1. Introduction 
There is a vast literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI), and yet our 
understanding of what drives FDI has remained seriously deficient. The bulk of the existing 
literature focuses on one particular set of possible FDI determinants, i.e., host-country 
characteristics that (may) help attract FDI. The other side of the coin, the characteristics of the 
firms undertaking FDI and the industries to which these firms belong, have been largely 
ignored until recently.
1
This paper is meant to help narrow the still wide gap between purely macroeconomic 
studies on FDI determinants and the nascent literature on the heterogeneity of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). We study a firm’s choice of what level of ownership to choose when 
setting up a foreign affiliate. This is an important question for a number of reasons. First, a 
parent may be more likely to transfer state-of-the-art technology to a wholly owned affiliate 
than to a joint venture in order to prevent the leakage of technology to the foreign partner 
(Desai, Foley and Hines 2004; Ramacharandran 1993). In turn, given these differences in the 
levels of technology, it has been shown that there are important differences in spillovers from 
majority and minority owned foreign affiliates of multinationals to the local economy 
(Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008; Blomström and Sjöholm 1999). Hence, the decision on the 
ownership share may ultimately have profound implications for the relationship between 
inward FDI and growth in the host economy.   
We focus in particular on firm characteristics as main determinant of the choice of 
ownership share in order to link our paper to the recent literature on firm level heterogeneity 
in the FDI decision (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004). To this end we combine two firm-
specific datasets on German companies being engaged in India as foreign direct investors. 
Germany belongs to the most important home countries of FDI,
2 and India may be second 
only to China when it comes to concerns about offshoring in the home countries of MNEs. 
The bilateral FDI context is clearly relevant for both Germany and India: 
•  Germany plays an important role in India’s efforts to attract FDI and, thereby, 
promote the process of economic catching up. In the 1990s, Germany ranked first 
among European direct investors in India.
3 
                                                           
1 Kravis and Lipsey (1982: 203) provide a notable exception: “Even in a single industry within a single parent 
country, firms with different characteristics will have very different propensities to produce abroad or to produce 
in particular countries.”   
2 It is only the United States and the United Kingdom whose outward FDI stocks clearly exceeded Germany’s 
outward FDI stocks in 2006 (UNCTAD 2007). 
3 Since 2000 Germany has been surpassed by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Kundu 2005; IGCC 
2007). 
  1   
•  India’s share in German FDI stocks is still relatively small; India hosted just three 
percent of stocks held in all developing countries in 2006, compared to 13 percent 
for China (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008). But German firms employed more than 
120.000 workers in India, accounting for almost eight percent of German firms’ 
employment in all developing countries.
4  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview of the 
relevant literature. Next we describe the firm-specific data used here, and provide some 
stylized facts on German firms’ FDI and technical collaboration in India (Section 3). We 
employ OLS and fractional logit models to assess the impact of firm, industry and location 
characteristics and present the estimation results in Section 4. The effect of several 
characteristics differs between the establishment of new affiliates by German MNEs and their 
engagement in already existing Indian firms. Most notably, the productivity of the parent 
companies matters only for ownership shares in new affiliates.  
 
2. Previous  literature 
The bulk of the existing literature on FDI determinants uses aggregate data to assess the 
importance of location factors at the macro level for host countries’ attractiveness to FDI. The 
major objective of cross-country and country-specific studies alike has often been to identify 
policy instruments that might be effective in attracting FDI to specific locations (Amiti and 
Javorcik 2008).
5 The recent survey by Blonigen (2005: 4) stresses that most of these studies 
“either ignore … micro-level factors or assume they are controlled for through an average 
industry- or country-level fixed effect.” Analyses on FDI determinants using aggregate data 
also fail to capture that FDI comes in various forms (e.g., wholly foreign owned affiliates or 
joint ventures with foreign minority stakes), and takes place in specific industries with 
varying characteristics (e.g., related to factor intensities). 
However, it is by now widely accepted that firm heterogeneity plays an important role 
in the decision to invest abroad, as established by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). Still, a 
substantial part of the recent empirical literature using firm-specific data has still in common 
with studies on aggregate FDI that the analysis is restricted to host-country characteristics as 
                                                           
4 Employment by German firms in India was only slightly less than that in China before 2002; in more recent 
years, smaller German investors (affiliates with balance sheets of less than € 3 million) are no longer covered in 
the FDI statistics of Deutsche Bundesbank. As a matter of fact, the source on which the subsequent analysis 
draws (IGCC 2003) reports a considerably higher number of employees in India (about 154.000 in all firms with 
German equity participation) than Deutsche Bundesbank (2008). The engagement in India was particularly 
strong in Germany’s traditional industrial strongholds such as machinery (see also Section 3).  
5 Apart from the United States as an advanced host country of FDI (e.g., Bobonis and Shatz 2007), China has 
received particular attention with respect to the factors underlying regional attractiveness to FDI (e.g., Cheng and 
Kwan 2000; Amiti and Javorcik 2008). 
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possible determinants of FDI. For instance, Head and Mayer (2004) use firm-specific 
Japanese data to assess some 450 location decisions at the regional level of EU countries. The 
focus is on the spatial distribution of demand as a pull factor of FDI, rather than firm 
characteristics that may push FDI. Buch et al. (2005) draw on firm-level FDI data for German 
companies to assess the relative role of host-country and firm characteristics. They account 
for heterogeneity mainly by including “a full set of firm-specific fixed effects” (page 84), 
finding that heterogeneity matters considerably for FDI-related internationalization patterns. 
However, the database of the Deutsche Bundesbank offers little information to control for 
factors that are specific to the German parent firm.
6 Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) explicitly 
control for firm size and the number of foreign subsidiaries in their Tobit model on labor 
market regulations as determinants of FDI flows across 19 European countries. But the degree 
of firm heterogeneity is reduced considerably by limiting the analysis to the largest European 
companies. 
Another group of studies provides a fuller account of firm-specific characteristics. 
Nachum and Wymbs (2002) cover various aspects of firm heterogeneity, but their analysis is 
narrowly confined to clustering of financial and professional service MNEs through mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) in London and New York. Geishecker, Görg and Taglioni (2008) 
characterize MNEs from twelve European home countries. They find strong links between the 
status of a firm and firm characteristics including productivity, size and profits. More 
productive and larger firms are shown to own more affiliates and to be more strongly engaged 
in distant locations. The interaction of location and firm characteristics remains, however, 
open to question. 
More closely related to our work, several studies analyze the determinants of the 
ownership structure of FDI projects by employing dichotomous choice models on wholly 
owned subsidiaries versus joint ventures. Gomes-Casseres (1989) shows for some 1500 
subsidiaries of about 180 US-based MNEs that this binomial choice depends on the nature of 
each subsidiary’s business, in combination with industry and host-country characteristics.
7 
The probability for a joint venture is lower, for instance, when the US parent is more 
experienced in the specific industry and more familiar with the host country, when the 
                                                           
6 Furthermore, the database of the Deutsche Bundesbank may underreport substantially FDI by smaller German 
firms. As noted before, reporting requirements have been relaxed since 2002, with FDI projects of less than € 3 
million no longer being covered.  
7 Gatignon and Anderson (1988) draw on the same database, the Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project 
covering the entry modes of US-based MNEs in 1960-1975. In contrast to Gomes-Casseres (1989), these authors 
consider the continuum of foreign ownership (5-100 percent equity). They find, inter alia, that MNEs with more 
experience abroad opt for wholly owned subsidiaries; R&D intensity positively affects the first-stage decision to 
aim at full ownership, while varying degrees of JV partnership are viewed as equivalent in the second stage once 
full ownership is ruled out. 
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subsidiary is integrated into intra-MNE trade, and when the subsidiary operates in an R&D 
intensive industry that is part of the parent company’s core business. Likewise, Blomström 
and Zejan (1991) find that Swedish MNEs with less diversified product lines and more 
foreign experience opt against minority ownership.
8 Javorcik (2000) focuses on intra-industry 
differences in R&D and marketing efforts to assess the choice between wholly owned 
subsidiaries and joint ventures in Eastern European transition countries. She finds that leading 
parent companies in terms of technology and marketing prefer wholly owned subsidiaries, 
though not in low-tech industries. 
Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) go beyond the dichotomy between wholly owned 
subsidiaries and joint ventures and treat the foreign equity share as a continuous variable. 
Note however that joint ventures account for only 14 percent of their sample of about 2400 
subsidiaries of US-based MNEs. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) complement firm characteristics 
by industry- and host country-related determinants of foreign equity shares, as we will do in 
the following. Firm characteristics include proxies of the parent firms’ assets and more widely 
used variables such as firm size, production diversity and international experience. Most firm 
characteristics impact significantly on the equity share, with the notable exception of firm 
size. 
Two particularly interesting papers for our work are by Raff, Ryan and Stähler (2007, 
2008). These papers relate directly to the recent work on firm heterogeneity and examine the 
links between firm characteristics (notably the productivity) of Japanese MNEs and their 
internationalization strategies. Raff, Ryan and Stähler (2007) analyze a sequence of 
internationalization decisions: Controlling for industry and country characteristics, it turns out 
that more productive Japanese firms are more likely to choose (i) FDI rather than exporting, 
(ii) greenfield FDI rather than M&As, and (iii) fully owned affiliates rather than joint 
ventures. Raff, Ryan and Stähler (2008) build a theoretical model which shows, inter alia, that 
firm productivity is positively correlated with the choice of ownership share in a foreign 
affiliate. They find empirical support for this proposition again using Japanese firm-level data 
and controlling for some host-country characteristics. Obvious questions remain, including 
whether these findings are specific to Japanese MNEs undertaking horizontal FDI,
9 or carry 
over to vertical FDI and to MNEs based elsewhere, and whether the findings would be robust 
to a fuller treatment of location and industry characteristics. 
                                                           
8 Blomström and Zejan (1991) address the dichotomy between minority and majority ownership, rather than that 
of wholly owned subsidiaries versus joint ventures. 
9 Note that Raff, Ryan and Stähler (2007) deliberately focus on horizontal Japanese FDI and restrict their MNE 
sample accordingly. Likewise, the analysis of Raff, Ryan and Stähler (2008) is restricted to 22 OECD host 
countries where FDI is most likely to be horizontal. 
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In summary, it is widely established that the heterogeneity of firms plays an important 
role for both the decision to undertake FDI (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004) and the 
choice of ownership share (Raff, Ryan and Stähler 2008). Yet, there continues to be a 
shortage of empirical studies combining location characteristics, industry characteristics and 
firm characteristics and, thus, providing a balanced picture on major pull and push factors of 
FDI in general, and the ownership structure of FDI projects in particular.  
 
3.  Data and stylized facts  
We combine two firm-specific datasets to assess the determinants of German company 
decisions on engaging in India. The first source, the Indo-German Chamber of Commerce 
(IGCC 2003), provides detailed information on almost 800 so-called financial and technical 
collaborations of German firms with Indian partners. The second source, the online databank 
of Hoppenstedt, a commercial data provider, contains company profiles of German companies 
with more than 20 employees or annual sales of more than one million €, including most of 
the parent firms with engagements in India. 
The directory compiled by the Indo-German Chamber of Commerce covers 
subsidiaries of German firms in India, joint ventures with Indian firms and other 
collaborations involving the production of goods and services.
10 The snapshot provided by 
this source relates to the situation as of 2003. The dataset includes joint ventures that do not 
fall under the usual FDI heading, i.e., involving a minimum of 10 percent of foreign equity 
participation. Purely technical collaboration (license) agreements without any financial 
engagement of the German firm are also included.  
It is in several respects that IGCC (2003) provides a particularly rich database. 
Information related to the type and intensity of the German firms’ engagement include: the 
type of collaboration (financial or purely technical), the year when the collaboration started as 
well as the founding year of the Indian partner firm,
11 the capital stock of the German 
subsidiary or Indo-German joint venture, the German share in paid up capital, annual sales, 
and employment.
12 In addition, it is clearly identified where exactly in India the German 
subsidiary or Indo-German joint venture is located. This renders it possible to account for 
                                                           
10 The directory excludes collaborations not involving any production such as agency agreements with Indian 
partners for the promotion of sales on behalf of German companies as well as representative and liaison offices 
set up by German firms in India. 
11 As detailed below, both years coincide if the German engagement results in a new firm that did not exist 
before. 
12 It should be noted, however, that some data are missing for various cases; this especially applies to annual 
sales. 
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regional characteristics at the level of Indian states and districts when assessing the 
determinants of the German firms’ engagement.  
It is important to note that the unit of observation in IGCC (2003) is the subsidiary, 
joint venture or purely technical collaboration, rather than the German parent or partner 
company.
13 Some German companies are actually involved in several projects, either FDI or 
technical collaboration; prominent examples include major German companies and 
conglomerates such as Daimler AG, Osram GmbH, Epcos AG, Allianz SE, and Siemens AG. 
In order to obtain more information on the German firms being engaged in India, we 
use Hoppenstedt’s company profiles to obtain information on the German parent relating to: 
(major and minor) line(s) of business with NACE industry code(s) (version 1.1), location, 
year of foundation, annual sales, number of employees, and number of (domestic and foreign) 
affiliates. We principally draw on the online database of Hoppenstedt 
(http://www.hoppenstedt-hochschuldatenbank.de). For many companies, however, 
employment and sales figures are available online only for most recent years. In order to 
appropriately match the parent firm data with the information on their engagement in India we 
refer to earlier hardcopies of Hoppenstedt (2004a; 2004b) for data on employment and sales 
in, preferably, 2002 (or the closest year available).
14
Apart from stand-alone companies, Hoppenstedt presents employees and sales for (i) 
specific firms belonging to a company group or conglomerate (“Konzern”) and (ii) the 
company group as a whole. We use company group data whenever applicable. Option (ii) is 
preferred since the decision to engage in India is highly likely to be taken at a higher company 
level. Moreover, option (i) would involve a downward bias for company size when minor 
segments of the conglomerate such as holdings provide the legal roof of foreign affiliates, 
while accounting for a small fraction of the conglomerate’s employment and sales.  
The firm-specific datasets are complemented by two sets of variables. First, we 
consider some important characteristics of the industry in Germany to which the parent firm 
belongs.
15 Characteristics such as R&D and skill intensity are supposed to be relevant per se 
                                                           
13 The same applies to the data used by Marin, Lorentowicz and Raubold (2003) as well as Raff, Ryan and 
Stähler (2007). 
14 While the matching is improved by drawing on Hoppenstedt (2004a; 2004b), this comes at the cost of losing 
some observations on German parent firms. The reason is that employment and sales thresholds are somewhat 
higher (35 employees or annual sales of more than € 3.5 million), compared to the online database. 
15 Most industry characteristics can be calculated at the 4-digit NACE level. An important exception is R&D 
intensity which is reported only at the 2-digit level (Statistisches Bundesamt 2002a). Note that the German 
Warenverzeichnis (WZ 2003) corresponds with NACE revision 1.1. 
  6   
for the decision on the ownership share (e.g., Javorcik, 2000).
16 Second, we consider some 
FDI determinants that are widely supposed to reflect the host economy’s attraction to FDI and 
which may also be relevant for a firm’s choice of ownership share in the foreign affiliate. We 
include the availability of skills (proxied by the ratio of student enrollment in higher 
education to population) as well as the cost of labor at the Indian state level. Appendix A 
presents exact definitions of all variables.  
Indo-German financial collaboration (FDI for short) and technical collaboration is 
concentrated in two major respects: (i) in a limited number of India’s states, and (ii) in some 
manufacturing industries.
17 The regional distribution is concentrated on the urbanized states 
in the south-west of India and around Delhi.
18 The distribution across states depends to some 
extent on whether one refers to headquarters or the factory location of the firms in India with 
German participation. Many headquarters are located in Delhi, Mumbai or Bangalore, while 
factories are located in other states. The factory location is of principal interest, notably in the 
manufacturing sector, when assessing the distribution of production activities (Head and 
Mayer 2004: 971). In various cases, however, there is no separate entry of factory location in 
the IGCC database (294 financial and technical collaborations). We then assume production 
to take place at the location of headquarters. We also use the headquarter location in cases for 
which the database lists several factory locations (43 financial and technical collaborations). 
Applying this combination of factory/ headquarter location, the top-5 Indian states 
(Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Delhi, Karnataka and Gujarat) attracted 74 percent of the number 
of FDI projects. The concentration of FDI-related employment is still stronger, with more 
than 82 percent of employees working in the top-5 states. Maharashtra alone accounts for 
about half of total paid up capital and employment, while its share in the number of 
collaborations is considerably smaller.
19 This difference can be attributed to some large FDI 
projects in manufacturing industries such as the production of motor vehicles and chemicals, 
notably the engagement of Daimler AG (formerly DaimlerChrysler AG) in two FDI 
                                                           
16 Ideally, one would of course refer to R&D intensity and skill intensity at the firm level. However, these data 
are generally not available; see Marin, Lorentowicz and Raubold (2003) for related survey data on German FDI 
projects in Eastern Europe. 
17 Detailed tables providing more information on the stylized facts summarized in the subsequent paragraphs are 
available in Appendix B. 
18 Twelve states mainly located in the eastern and northern hinterland did not take part in any (financial or 
technical) collaboration with German companies: Sikkim, Assam, Arunchal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, 
Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya (all in the east), Jammu & Kashmir, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Chhattisgarh. 
19 By contrast, Delhi hosts more than 13 percent of all headquarters of German subsidiaries and Indo-German 
JVs, while its share in FDI-related capital and employment is considerably smaller. This gap is at least partly due 
to the relatively small size of headquarter operations.  
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projects.
20 The regional concentration of German FDI is in line with that of approved FDI 
from all source countries in 2001-2005 (Nunnenkamp and Stracke 2008).  
Turning to the distribution across sectors and industries, the German engagement in 
the services sector remained marginal until 2003. The focus of German FDI in India was 
clearly on the manufacturing sector, which accounted for 78-92 percent of total FDI 
depending on the FDI measure applied. The German engagement is also concentrated within 
manufacturing. Mechanical engineering, chemicals, and metal products figure most 
prominently in terms of the number of FDI projects. However, the industry ranking changes 
considerably when taking account of the size of FDI projects. As noted before, a few 
exceptionally large projects in the production of motor vehicles affect the distribution of 
German FDI in India, notably when calculating shares in terms of FDI-related employment.
21
The prominence of some large FDI projects is also evident from the characteristics of 
the IGCC data shown in Table 1. All the same, three quarters of German FDI projects involve 
subsidiaries or joint ventures with less than Rs. 60 million of paid up capital in 2003 (slightly 
more than € one million at exchange rates of 2003); the median of employment is slightly 
below 50 workers. Large and small FDI projects have in common that the median of the 
German equity share typically is in the range of 50-60 percent. While minority shares of up to 
25 percent are clearly the exception (54 out of 550 observations), almost a third of all FDI 
projects are wholly German owned subsidiaries. Another similarity is that financial 
collaboration typically started in the mid-1990s, i.e., after FDI regulations were relaxed in the 
course of India’s economic reform program of 1991 (CUTS 2003). Larger FDI projects in 
terms of paid up capital are by far more capital intensive than smaller projects. At the same 
time, the ratio of turnover to employees for the first decile exceeds the corresponding ratio for 
the last decile by a factor of seven (calculated for the median of turnover and employment in 
the respective decile).  
                                                           
20 The cases of DaimlerChrysler India Pvt. Ltd. and Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. accounted for 
more than 40 percent of FDI-related capital and employment in Maharashtra.  
21 Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd., an Indian partner of Daimler AG, employed 38.000 workers in 
Pune. 
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mill  (#obs) % (#obs) numb
er  (#obs) Rs. 






FDI (financial coll.), 
all cases (610)  12.8  (476) 51 (550) 48 (483) 81.9 (359)  1996  0.27 1.71 
FDI deciles (capital in descending order) 
  1st  (47)  400  52.7   338.5  (44)  1875.1  (38)  1995  1.18  5.54 
  2nd  (47)  116    51  (44) 125 (46) 487.2 (30)  1996  0.93 3.90 
  3rd  (47)  60    54.5 (46) 122 (45) 290.8 (38)  1994  0.49 2.38 
  4th  (47)  30    50.5 (42) 100 (43)  92  (33)  1996  0.30 0.92 
 5th  (47)  20  51  50  (43)  108.4  (37)  1996  0.40  2.17 
  6th  (47)  10    60  (46) 32.5 (42)  60  (30)  1996  0.31 1.85 
 7th  (47)  5.6   50   35.5  (44)  38.3  (36)  1994  0.16  1.08 
  8th  (47)  3    50 (46) 31 (45) 24.1 (38)  1995  0.10  0.78 
 9th  (47)  2  51   19.5  (40)  13.4  (35)  1995  0.10  0.69 
  10th  (53)  0.6    51 (51) 12 (50)  9.5  (34)  1995  0.05  0.79 
               
technical 
collaboration, all 
(147) 20  (108)  ---  ---  150  (119)  120  (107)  1998  0.13  0.80 
Number of observations given in parentheses only when less than total in first column. 
Source: IGCC (2003). 
 
In order to connect our work with the recent theoretical and empirical work on firm 
heterogeneity in FDI, we focus on productivity as a firm characteristic to see how this is 
related to the ownership share. In what follows, we concentrate on cases of financial 
collaboration only (i.e., where the ownership share is strictly greater than zero). Raff, Ryan 
and Stähler (2008) present a theoretical model and evidence which shows that more 
productive firms tend to choose higher ownership shares. In order to check whether this is 
borne out in our data, we present as a first step a diagram plotting the average German 
ownership share for four productivity quartiles.
22 As can be seen, there is weak evidence that 
firms with higher productivity have higher ownership shares, but the difference across groups 
is only marginal. Of course, we are not able to exploit the various dimensions in our data in 
                                                           
22 We find some strong outliers in terms of labor productivity in our data. In order to mitigate their influence we 
drop observations with labor productivity higher than 2.5 to avoid a bias because of holdings with low 
employment and very high turnover. 
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this graph, confounding firm, state and industry variables. In order to get a more complete 
picture of this issue, we now turn to a more formal modeling of the choice of ownership share.   
 

































4   Methodology and results 
In order to test the relationship between firm, industry, state characteristics and the ownership 
share we postulate the following empirical model: 
 
 gsii = β1 sizei + β2 productivityi + β3 Xi + β4 Xj + β5 Xs + ei   (1) 
 
where gsi is the ownership share in firm i; size (measured in terms of employment) and 
productivity (measured as labor productivity) are also at the firm level and there are three 
vectors of control variables at the firm i, industry j and sector s level. Given that we include 
the latter two categories of controls we also allow the error term e to be clustered around the 
industry-state dimension. Note that we focus here also on financial cases, excluding purely 
technical cases (with zero ownership share) from the analysis.
23  
Note that we interpret statistically significant coefficients as indicating correlations 
rather than causality. To do the latter we would have to make sure that there is no correlation 
between the variable and the error term, i.e., take account of possible endogeneity. Given the 
                                                           
23 We do, however, include these in the sample in a robustness check below.   
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cross-section nature of our data it is difficult to come up with convincing instruments that 
would allow us to do this. Instead, we lag firm size and productivity in equation (1) to at least 
mitigate problems of endogeneity (see Appendix A for details). 
Table 2 presents the results of estimations of equation (1) using simple OLS. Column 
(1) includes only the two main firm level variables, size and labor productivity. Note that 
there is a positive correlation between size and ownership share – larger parents tend to be 
associated with higher participation in the foreign subsidiary. By contrast, labor productivity 
is not statistically significantly related to ownership share, although the coefficient is positive 
as expected by Raff, Ryan and Stähler. (2008). This result is robust to inclusion of other 
variables, as can be seen in the remaining columns in the table.
24 In columns (2) to (4) we 
successively add more firm, industry and state variables into the equation.   
The first firm level variable is a dummy indicating whether the Indian affiliate is a new 
firm or whether it is a German participation in an already existing Indian firm. A new firm is 
defined as one where the age of the Indian affiliate equals the age of collaboration, so that we 
can conclude that the investment was a new setup of a subsidiary. This may be an important 
variable to include as new firms may be expected to be generally more technology intensive. 
Indeed, Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp (2008) find, based on surveys of the Reserve Bank of 
India, that so-called FDI companies from various home countries have transferred more 
sophisticated technologies as well as undertaken more local R&D in India since the country’s 
reform program in 1991. Previous studies have shown that foreign investors may prefer 
higher ownership shares the more technology intensive the project is in order to prevent 
leakage of the technology to the foreign partner (e.g., Gomes-Casseres 1989). As the 
consistently positive and statistically significant coefficients on this variable indicate, the 
formation of a new firm in India generally implies a higher ownership share by the German 
parent, in line with this hypothesis.   
In line with earlier work we also add a variable capturing the number of industries in 
which a parent firm is operating to proxy the level of diversification of the parent. Previous 
papers hypothesize that more diversified parents are less likely to engage in full ownership, 
although the empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis is weak (e.g., Javorcik 2000; 
Meyer 1998). This variable is, also, consistently statistically insignificant in our estimation.   
Another firm level determinant relates to firms’ experience of investing abroad. For 
example, Geishecker, Görg and Taglioni (2008) show that European multinationals on 
                                                           
24 Note that the pair-wise correlation in the sample between log employment size and log labor productivity is 
only 0.029 and is not statistically significant. Hence, multicollinearity is not a likely explanation for the 
statistically insignificant result on labor productivity. 
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average have more than one foreign affiliate, and that there is a positive correlation between 
the number of foreign affiliates and the productivity of a multinational. In other words, highly 
productive firms tend to invest more abroad. Arguably, the level of experience abroad may 
also have implications for the choice of ownership. Firms with no experience may have to 
cooperate with foreign partners who know about the foreign environment. By contrast, firms 
with large experience abroad may not have to rely on foreign partners but are familiar with 
overseas operations and can therefore choose to go on their own. This implies that we would 
expect a positive correlation between the number of foreign affiliates a firm has, and its 
choice of ownership share (see also Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Blomström and Zejan 
1991). Inclusion of this variable, however, yields statistically insignificant coefficients.   
Given that our dependent variable is measured in 2003, there is concern that firms 
established before that date increase or decrease their ownership share over time. To control 
for this we include the year of establishment of the collaboration.  The coefficients on this 
variable are negative, although not always statistically significant. Finally, given that India 
liberalized its regulations towards foreign direct investment from 1991 onwards (CUTS 2003; 
FICCI 2005), a lower ownership share by firms established before 1991 may not reflect 
economic optimization but only the effect of the regulation. To control for this we include a 
dummy which is equal to one from 1991 onwards. This variable, as expected, returns 
consistently positive and statistically significant coefficients.   
Column (3) adds two variables to the equation which control for characteristics of the 
German industry. These are the average wage in the industry as well as the R&D intensity of 
production. This, therefore, allows checking whether the fact that a parent operates in a high 
wage (skill) or high technology industry has any implications for its choice of ownership 
share. Previous literature finds that firms in R&D and skill intensive industries tend to prefer 
full to shared ownership in order to assure product quality and prevent leakage of knowledge 
(e.g., Javorcik 2000; Gomes-Casseres 1989).
25 However, the coefficients turn out to be 
statistically insignificant in our case. This may reflect that the choice of ownership share is 
not only due to industry characteristics but, more importantly, driven by attributes of the firm 
(see also Javorcik 2000).  
A distinct novelty of our paper is that we have information on the regional location of 
the investment and, accordingly, we add two variables proxying characteristics of the Indian 
host state to the estimation in column (4). The percentage of student enrollment in higher 
                                                           
25 However, these studies generally proxy industry characteristics using data for the host country, while we use 
information on the home country industry. Arguably, the characteristics of the home country industry are a better 
indicator of the technology level used in the industry than the host country.   
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education, a measure of skills at the state level, returns a positive and statistically significant 
sign. Firms choose higher ownership shares in states with high levels of human capital. We 
also find that the level of labor costs in a state is negatively correlated with the ownership 
share – firms locating in low wage states tend to go for higher capital shares in the foreign 
affiliates. This is in line with previous findings by Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) who argue that 
higher wages tend to go along with lower foreign equity shares.  
One point to criticize in the estimations thus far is that the dependent variable is the 
log of the ownership share, where the share ranges from 2.5 to 100 percent. Hence, we have a 
variable that is bounded in this interval. Ignoring this form of the distribution of the variable 
and using simple OLS to estimate the model may lead to biased results. In order to deal with 
this more appropriately we use the absolute level of the ownership share, appropriately scaled 
between 0.025 and 1, and employ for estimation the quasi-likelihood method developed by 
Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
26 This fractional logit model allows dealing with a fractional 
response variable in the interval [0,1] taking account of its bounded nature and the possibility 
of observing values at the boundaries of the interval.
27 It is reassuring to note, however, that 
this different estimator does not change the results qualitatively in any significant way.   
Another potential criticism is that we in effect treat the liberalization of FDI 
regulations pursued by India as a “big bang” which is captured by a dummy equal to one from 
1991 on and thereafter. While this is the contention of some experts,
28 others would argue that 
there have been gradual changes since 1991 (e.g., CUTS 2003). These may not be reflected 
adequately in the simple dummy variable included in the model thus far. In order to allow for 
more gradual effects over time, we therefore include annual dummy variables from 1991 
onwards, with the base category being years before 1991. We do not report the coefficients on 
these 12 dummies (1991 to 2003) in Table 2 to save space, but we note that they are jointly 
statistically significant (as indicated by the Wald tests reported in the table) and mostly 
positive and individually significant also. The results of this estimation are reported in column 
(7), which are very similar to those of the fractional logit in column (6). The only difference is 
                                                           
26 A tobit model is in this context not appropriate as it assumes a truncated distribution, i.e., part of the 
distribution is not observable due to censoring. In the case here, the variable is bounded between 0 and 1 by 
definition, which is a different issue.   
27 Note that, while industry dummies in columns (1) to (4) are defined at three digit NACE level, estimation of 
the fractional logit model did not achieve convergence with three digit dummies. We therefore estimated this 
model with two digit NACE level dummies, reported in columns (5) and (6). To check whether this may 
introduce a problem into our analysis we also re-estimated the equation reported in column (4) using two digit 
dummies. The results are very close to the results using three digit dummies. We are therefore confident that 
using two digit dummies does not lead to any biased results.   
28 For instance, Balasubramanyam and Mahambare (2003: 46) argue: “The 1991 reforms marked a major break 
from the earlier dirigiste regime with its regulation of the spheres of foreign affiliate participation and its modes 
of operation.” 
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the coefficient on new firms, which is now statistically insignificant. This may indicate that 
“new firm” captures to some extent time or regulatory effects. Of course, given the nature of 
our data we cannot comment on causality, but merely establish correlations. Hence, a possible 
alternative explanation is based on reverse causation. Rather than new and higher-tech 
projects resulting in higher German equity shares, the deregulation of ownership restrictions 
provides better incentives to transfer up-to-date technologies. 
 
Table 2: Baseline estimation results 
 
         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




ln(size)  0.066 0.055 0.055 0.052 0.048 0.155 0.161 
  (0.025)***  (0.026)** (0.026)** (0.026)**  (0.018)*** (0.045)*** (0.042)*** 
ln(productivity)  0.112 0.103 0.103 0.125 0.008 0.169 0.191 
  (0.115) (0.107) (0.107) (0.104) (0.072) (0.145) (0.158) 
Firm controls         
age    -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.021 -0.019 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)**  (0.008)** 
diversification    0.027 0.027 0.022 0.017 0.024 0.054 
    (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.035) (0.037) 
dummy      0.445 0.445 0.425 0.373 0.713  
liberalization   (0.142)***  (0.142)***  (0.145)*** (0.122)*** (0.231)***  
new  firm    0.187 0.186 0.192 0.223 0.554 0.270 
    (0.076)** (0.075)** (0.078)** (0.096)** (0.230)** (0.252) 
#  affiliates   0.011 0.011 0.013 0.008 0.015 0.010 
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018) (0.016) 
Industry 
controls 
       
ln(wageind)    -0.028  -0.022  0.095  0.333  0.215 
      (0.171) (0.177) (0.114) (0.248) (0.264) 
ln(R&D)    0.187  0.129  -0.106  -0.253  -0.139 
      (0.128) (0.133) (0.101) (0.194) (0.208) 
State controls         
ln(skill)     0.274  0.298  0.951  0.800 
     (0.107)**  (0.091)***  (0.219)***  (0.266)*** 
ln(wagestat)     -0.292  -0.340  -0.964  -0.963 
     (0.214)  (0.216)  (0.461)**  (0.496)* 
Observations  282 282 282 282 282 282 282 
Wald test (p-
value) 
      0 . 0 0  
R-squared  0.24 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.33    
 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state-industry level     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
All regressions include industry dummies.  In column (1) to (4) these are defined at 3-digit NACE level, in 
columns (5) to (7) at 2-digit NACE level 




Thus far we have assumed that the effect of the independent variables on the 
ownership share is homogenous across different types of firms. We now relax this 
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assumption. Specifically, we examine whether there are differences in the determinants of the 
ownership share between affiliates that are newly established firms, and those where the 
German ownership participation is in an Indian firm that existed already before and continued 
to operate under the same name. Newly established affiliates in this context include 
completely new and fully owned greenfield investments as well as new joint ventures with 
Indian partners that lead to the setup of a legally independent new firm. Why would we expect 
differences between such new and old affiliates? As shown above, the setup of new firms is 
generally associated with higher ownership shares. It is reasonable to assume that this reflects 
the use of more sophisticated technology in these types of affiliates compared to the setup of 
ownership links with already established Indian firms. Under this assumption it may also be 
expected that other variables impact differently on the ownership share choice of the two 
types of firms.   
Here we are particularly concerned with productivity. This variable, thus far, has, 
contrary to expectations, not been an important determinant of the ownership share. We argue 
and empirically check whether this is due to pooling these two types of firms. It may be the 
case that for the German investor’s engagement in “old firms” with less than sophisticated 
technology the productivity of the parent does not play a role. By contrast, for the setup of 
new firms, associated with high technology, the productivity of the parent may be relevant for 
operating at the technological frontier and further upgrading the level of technology. Hence, 
we may expect that productivity matters as a determinant of the ownership share of new firms 
– with parents with higher productivity (thus higher technology) preferring, ceteris paribus, 
higher ownership shares.   
We examine these hypotheses in Table 3, where we split the sample into “new” and 
“old” firms and estimate the fully specified model as discussed above separately for the two 
samples. The results are in columns (1) and (2). As expected, there are indeed differences in 
the coefficients for these two types of firms. For new firms we find that productivity levels of 
the parent are positively correlated with the ownership share, while this is not the case for 
German capital participation in old firms. This is in line with our reasoning above. The same 
goes for the proxy of the level of diversification of the parent, which is positively correlated 
only for new firms.
29 Assuming that diversification is also a proxy for the level of technology 
this result fits in with our discussion above. 
                                                           
29 By contrast, Meyer (1998) and Javorcik (2000) find either a statistically insignificant or negative correlation 
with the probability of choosing a wholly owned affiliate. One possible explanation is that the research question 
is different. The previous literature has a probit model on joint vs. wholly owned affiliates, while we model the 
share of ownership as a dependent variable.   
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A further difference with the results reported in Table 2 is that R&D intensity in a 
sector is now statistically significant and positively correlated with the firms’ choice of 
ownership share. This is in line with much of the previous literature which shows that firms in 




Table 3: Distinguishing new and old firms 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  logit newfirm  logit oldfirm  logit newfirm  logit oldfirm  logit newfirm  logit oldfirm 
ln(size) 0.343 0.081 0.314 0.045 0.381 0.011 
 (0.077)***  (0.062)  (0.091)*** (0.044)  (0.092)*** (0.054) 
ln(productivity)  0.830 0.054 0.935 0.068 0.726 -0.103 
 (0.292)***  (0.182)  (0.286)*** (0.213)  (0.277)*** (0.268) 
Firm controls        
age  -0.043 -0.013 -0.034 -0.015 -0.050 0.031 
 (0.018)**  (0.013)  (0.018)*  (0.010) (0.020)**  (0.009)*** 
diversification  0.168 0.030 0.155 0.069 0.191 0.045 
 (0.085)**  (0.056)  (0.083)* (0.053)  (0.087)**  (0.045) 
#  affiliates  -0.022 0.025  -0.021 0.039  -0.041 0.076 
  (0.033) (0.025) (0.029) (0.020) (0.032) (0.025)*** 
dummy    0.655  0.646      
liberalization  (0.442)  (0.276)**      
Industry controls        
ln(wageind)  0.063 0.294 0.383 0.071 0.346 0.206 
  (0.358) (0.338) (0.417) (0.350) (0.309) (0.350) 
ln(R&D)  3.722 5.640 3.588 5.979 3.193 3.051 
 (0.414)***  (0.346)***  (0.376)***  (0.410)*** (0.387)*** (0.314)*** 
State controls        
ln(skill) 0.443 0.861 0.424 0.626 0.994 0.486 
 (0.359)  (0.337)**  (0.339)  (0.353)* (0.414)**  (0.395) 
ln(wagestat)  0.233 -1.330  0.215 -1.395  0.680 -0.238 
  (0.769) (0.847) (0.698) (0.765)*  (0.666) (0.743) 
Observations  109 173 109 173 115 220 
 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state-industry level     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
All regressions include two digit industry dummies.   
Columns (3) to (6) also include a set of time dummies starting in 1991; Wald test for joint significance of time 
dummies  
Column (5) and (6) include technical cases, with gsi = 0 
 
 
As a robustness check, columns (3) and (4) present estimations which use annual 
dummies from 1991 onwards to allow for gradual changes in the regulatory environment. 
This does not change our results in any important way. Columns (5) and (6) add another 
robustness check. Recall that the sample used for the estimations includes German capital 
participations in Indian affiliates – i.e., the capital participation is always larger than zero. In 
                                                           
30 Note that this result also indicates that inappropriate pooling of new and old firms, which assumes 
homogenous effects of all covariates and a common variance-covariance matrix, leads to misleading results on 
the importance of sector level R&D intensity.   
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our data, however, we also have information on another type of international cooperation, 
namely, technical collaboration. In these so-called “technical cases”, there is no transfer of 
capital (i.e., a zero ownership share of the German partner) but there is a transfer of 
technology. In the last step of our analysis we add these technical cases to our sample. In 
effect we, hence, add a number of observations with zero ownership share. Reassuringly, our 
results on the relationship between productivity and foreign ownership share are robust to this 
change in the sample. 
 
5  Summary and conclusion 
This paper contributes to the recent literature on the heterogeneity of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) by analyzing the relevance of firm-specific characteristics when MNEs decide on the 
share of ownership in foreign affiliates. We combine two largely unnoticed datasets on 
German MNEs with varying equity stakes in Indian affiliates. The impact of firm 
characteristics on ownership shares is assessed in the context of OLS and Fractional logit 
models, controlling for industry and location characteristics. In contrast to most previous 
studies employing dichotomous choice models on wholly owned subsidiaries versus joint 
ventures, the data used in the present study allows treating the German MNEs’ equity shares 
as a continuous variable. 
While the data presents a unique and rich source to study the decisions by German 
MNEs, the bilateral Indo-German setting of the present paper implies also limitations. Further 
research is required in several respects. First of all, the findings for German FDI do not 
necessarily apply to companies based elsewhere. Likewise, the motivations underlying FDI in 
India are bound to differ from those of FDI in smaller developing countries or advanced host 
countries. Ideally, one might aim at panel analyses covering various host countries and 
revealing more than just a snapshot of one particular year. However, such data are at present 
not available. 
The findings that emerge in our empirical analysis are somewhat ambiguous for the 
overall sample of Indo-German collaborations. Several factors are clearly correlated with 
higher ownership shares. For instance, larger parent companies prefer higher equity shares. 
The formation of a new firm in India, i.e., an arguably more technology intensive engagement 
than a joint venture with an already existing firm, generally implies a higher ownership share 
by the German parent. On the other hand, the correlation between the productivity of the 
parent firm and its ownership share, though positive, remains statistically insignificant – in 
contrast to what could be expected. 
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A distinct novelty of the present paper helps disentangle the links between the parent’s 
productivity and its ownership share. The data allows examining whether there are differences 
in the determinants of the ownership share between the establishment of new affiliates by 
German MNEs and their engagement in already existing Indian firms. Indeed, the effect of 
several firm characteristics (and also industry characteristics) differs between these two 
subsamples of affiliates. Most notably, the productivity of the German parents matters only 
for ownership shares in new affiliates. It appears that the productivity of the parent is relevant 
for operating at the technological frontier and further upgrading the level of technology for 
the setup of a new firm employing relatively sophisticated technology. By contrast, the 
productivity of the parent does not play a role when German companies invest in existing 
firms with less than sophisticated technology. 
In terms of policy implications our work points to a major aspect of heterogeneity that 
needs to be taken into account by governments attracting foreign direct investment to boost 
their growth performance. There is an important distinction in terms of productivity and, by 
implication technology between newly set up firms and existing firms which attract some 
capital inflow from abroad. Host-country governments aiming at greenfield FDI by 
productive MNEs may be well advised to relax foreign ownership restrictions, as India has 
done since the early 1990s, in order to get better access to foreign technology.  
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Appendix A – Definition and sources of variables 
Variable Definition    Source 
German subsidiary or joint venture in India:  
gsi  German share in paid up capital, percent; 2003  IGCC (2003) 
age  Year of subsidiary, JV or technical collaboration going into operation  IGCC (2003) 
new firm  Dummy variable; equals “one” if the founding year of the Indian partner 




Dummy variable accounting for the liberalization of Indian FDI regulations 
since 1991; equals “one” for collaborations established from 1991 onwards, 
and “zero” otherwise 
IGCC (2003). 
    
Characteristics of German parent firm:  
size  Size of the parent company, measured by number of employees; in logs; 













diversification  Number of industries (4-digit NACE codes) in which the parent firm is 
active (proxy of degree of diversification) 
Hoppenstedt 
(online) 
   
Industry characteristics in Germany:  
wageind  Skill intensity, proxied by gross wage and salary payments per employee; 




R&D  R&D intensity, measured by R&D expenses in percent of gross production; 




   
Location characteristics in Indian states:  




skill  Student enrollment in higher than secondary education; share of population; 
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Appendix B:  
 
German FDI and technical collaboration in India: Distribution across Indian States (percent)  
 


























Maharashtra 35.7  32.0  31.8  49.2  53.4 
Delhi 13.1  10.2  11.1  4.6  4.5 
Tamil Nadu  12.7  12.7  12.3  3.9  5.1 
Karnataka 10.4  10.2  10.5  6.4  15.9 
Gujarat 6.1  8.6  8.0  7.0  3.7 
West Bengal   5.4  5.0  4.9  9.6  1.6 
Haryana 4.5  5.4  5.6  5.1  5.1 
Uttarranchal 4.0  5.0  5.1  4.3  3.6 
Andhra Pradesh  3.6  3.6  3.1  0.8  0.8 
Kerala 1.2  1.2  1.3  0.1  0.1 
Rajasthan 0.8  0.9  1.0  0.1  0.1 
Jharkhand 0.7  1.1  1.0  0.4  0.3 
Madhya Pradesh  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.1  0.2 
Punjab 0.5  0.8  0.7  1.9  3.0 
Bihar 0.3  0.3  0.3  0.0  0.0 
Pondicherry 0.3  0.5  0.7  3.4  0.3 
Goa 0.1  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.3 
Chandigarh 0.1  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.5 
Daman & Diu  0  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6 
Himachal Pradesh  0  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1 
Dadra & Nagar Haveli  0  0.1  0  0  0 
Orissa 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.2 
Uttar Pradesh  0  0.1  0.2  1.2  0.7 
            
# observations  757  757  610  476  483 




a Factory location whenever available for one particular state; HQ when no separate entry of factory location and 
when several factory locations given (see text for details). 
b Rs. million. 
c Number of employees. 
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German FDI and technical collaboration in India: Distribution across industries (percent) 
 











Mining and quarrying  0.2  0.7  0.0  0.0 
Manufacturing 78.4  88.2  80.1  92.0 
  Manufacture of textiles    1.1  0.0  0.3  0.2 
  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products    9.6 7.4  14.7  9.7 
  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products    3.9  5.1  3.0  1.9 
  Manufacture of basic metals    2.5  3.7  4.8  4.3 
  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and equipment    7.4 5.1  2.2 2.6 
  Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
n.e.c.    28.9 38.2  18.3 16.8 
  Manufacture of electrical machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c.    5.7 3.7  5.1 5.0 
  Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus    2.1 2.2  2.8 1.8 
  Manufacture of medical, precision and 
optical instruments, watches and clocks    5.7 9.6  1.3 1.5 
  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers    4.4 4.4  23.9  45.6 
 Other  manufacturing  4.6  3.7  3.9  1.1 
Construction    1.4  1.5  0.3  0.5 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods   
7.1 5.9  4.7 1.2 
Transport, storage and communication    2.3  0  3.3  1.1 
Financial intermediation    1.6  0  7.6  0.9 
Real estate, renting and business activities    8.0  2.9  3.8  3.9 
Other services/ utilities   1.1  0.7  0.3  0.3 
Total 571  139  42524.03  154329
b 
a Rs. million. 
b Number of employees. 
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